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STATE OF UTAH 
JERROLD L. DAVIS dba JERRY DAVIS AND 
ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
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FLINDERS, KATHRYN B. HEATH, DOROTHY 
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Cross-Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14549 
APPELLANTS BRIEF ON APPEAL 
**** 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND Of CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff real estate broker to 
recover a real estate commission, and by cross-complainants 
for specific performance of an earnest money agreement. The 
suit was against Heath Development Company, a corporation, 
it having been stipulated prior to trial that the actions 
against the individual defendants be dismissed with prejudice. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a trial before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor sit-
ting without a jury, the court found for the plaintiff and 
for the cross-claimants and entered judgment for the real 
estate commission and an order of specific performance of 
the earnest money agreement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
• ' •' i .... • " • 1 . 1 i 
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the District 
Court reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Heath Development Company is a Utah Cor-
poration, its only asset being the Pioneer Trailer Park located 
at 937 South State in Salt Lake City, Utah. (T. 447). It is 
a close family corporation having a total of nine stockholders 
at the time of these transactions. Five of the nine stock-
holders serve on the Board of Directors^ 
In recent years the corporation h#s listed the Pioneer 
Trailer Park for sale with various realtors for the sum of 
$400,000.00 (T. 402). On a prior occasion an oral offer of 
$325,000.00 had been made, but not accepted by the corporation. 
(T. 403). On November 13, 1973 Dorothy A. Housely, a director 
in the company, (T. 402) , and the manager of the Pioneer 
Trailer Park, (T. 402) , signed a listing with the plaintiff 
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real estate broker for the sales price of $400,000.00. (T. 402). 
Thereafter on November 19, 1973, six of the stockholders of 
the company signed a document purporting to ratify the original 
listing agreement signed by Dorothy A. Housely. (T. 319). 
Pursuant to the listing agreement, plaintiff attempted 
to sell the Pioneer Trailer Park but was unsuccessful. (T. 322). 
Without any encouragement from plaintiff, and without any 
solicitation or effort on plaintiff's part, Dorothy A. Housely, 
the same person who signed the listing agreement, decided that 
she would like to purchase the trailer park. (T. 323). After 
conferring with the plaintiff and with her sister and brother-
in-law, Bonnie and Elmer Brinton (Bonnie also being a stock-
holder and director) an Earnest Money Offer was prepared on 
January 12, 1974, wherein Dorothy and Bonnie offered to purchase 
the trailer park for $250,000.00. (T. 325). 
On that date the plaintifffs agent, Mason Rankin, tele-
phoned the President of the corporation, Kathryn D. Heath, to 
arrange a directors' meeting for presentation of the offer. 
(T. 326). The meeting was scheduled for the next afternoon 
at the home of Kathryn D. Heath. (T. 326). Those present 
at the directors1 meeting on January 13, 1974, at which the 
offer was presented, included: Kathryn D. Heath, President, 
Director and owner of 20% of the common stock; Essie Heath 
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(since deceased), Secretary, Director and owner of 20% of 
the common stock; Dorothy A. Housely, Director and owner of 
approximately 20% of the common stock; Bonnie Brinton, Treas-
urer, Director and owner of approximately 20% of the common 
stock; the plaintiff and plaintiff's agent, Mason Rankin 
(T. 325-330). 
Of the four directors present it was the first time 
that any of them had actually received a written offer to pur-
chase the sole asset of the corporation. (T. 426-7). Mr. 
Rankin went through the offer of purchase at least twice, and 
insisted that the property was only worth $250,000.00 rather 
than the $400,000.00 that it was listed at and that they would 
not receive a better offer. (T. 448-450). This meeting lasted 
for about two hours. (T. 390). Essie Hfeath, the secretary of 
the corporation, was so confused by the offer she couldn't 
even write it in the minutes and asked cbne of the purchasers 
to write the terms of the offer in the minute book which Mrs. 
Housely did. (T. 414). 
The plaintiff and his agent were aware that they were 
dealing with a corporation and with the sale of corporate 
property. (T. 348-349). The plaintiff ind his agent were 
both duly licensed and knowledgeable in the real estate bus-
iness. (T. 385-386). Neither plaintiff nor his agent gave 
any instructions to the directors on how to sign the Earnest 
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Money document. (T. 506). All signatures are in a personal 
capacity and nothing on the document purports to bind the 
corporation. (T. 471-472; and T. 519). 
The Articles of Incorporation call for five directors 
with the qualification that each hold one full share of 
common stock. (Exhibit 5-P). The fifth director, Sandra 
Flinders, held less than one full share of stock. (P. 352). 
However, the other stockholders had continuously and unani-
mously elected her a director and authorized her to function 
as vice president since 1964. (T. 487-488). The Articles 
of Incorporation provide that a majority of the directors 
shall constitute a quorum and the act of the majority of the 
quorum shall be the act of the corporation. (Exhibit 5-P). 
The Earnest Money Agreement signed January 13, 1974, 
was further conditioned upon the buyer's obtaining financing. 
(Exhibit 3-P). The buyers did not qualify for financing on 
their own. (T. 382-383). On or about March 15, 1974, after 
two months of trying to obtain financing, the plaintiff through 
his agent Mason Rankin presented an offer to purchase the 
trailer park to Dorothy A. Housely and Bonnie Brinton for 
$400,000.00. (T. 375). Bonnie Brinton and Dorothy A. Housely 
were directors of Heath Development Company at this time and 
did not disclose this offer to anyone else in the corporation. 
(T. 476). Hugh Wayman, the new purchaser, agreed to co-sign 
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for Mrs. Housely*s and Mrs. Brintonfs financing on the orig-
inal purchase agreement. (T. 382-383). The lending institu-
tion agreed to make the loan with Hugh Wayman being responsible 
for repayment (T. 382-383). 
On April 9, 1974, Mason Rankin took a warranty deed to 
the home of Kathryn D. Heath for her signature. (T. 452). 
The proposed deed was from the corporation to Dorothy Housely 
and Bonnie and Elmer Brinton. The deed did not contain the 
name of Hugh Wayman nor did Mason Rankin tell Mrs. Heath 
anything about Mr. Wayman. (Exhibit 7-P). Mrs. Heath refused 
to sign the deed. (T. 454). On April 11, 1974, the plaintiff 
presented another Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase 
directly to the corporation from Hugh Wayman for $400,000.00. 
(T. 521) . After counterproposals between Hugh Wayman and the 
corporation, no agreement was reached. Suit was filed by 
plaintiff for a real estate commission on the Earnest Money 
Agreement of January 13, 1974, and a cross-claim was filed 
by Dorothy Housely and Bonnie Brinton for specific performance 
under the $250,000.00 Earnest Money Agreement of January 13, 
1974. 
The court found that the listing agreement was valid 
and that the plaintiff secured and presented an offer to pur-
chase the Pioneer Trailer Park for $250,000.00 from a ready, 
willing and able buyer and that the offer was accepted by 
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the corporation, (R. 275-279). Based on these findings, 
the court entered judgment for plaintiff for the real estate 
commission in the amount of $15,000.00 with interest at 6% 
per annum from April 10, 1974, for a total to date of entry 
of judgment, of $16,650.00. Also the court awarded attorney's 
fees of $5,000.00 with interest at 6% per annum on the attorney's 
fees from April 10, 1974, until the date of judgment. (R. 280-
281). Further, the court ordered specific performance on the 
cross-claim ordering the corporation to convey the property 
to directors Dorothy Housely and Bonnie Brinton and awarded 
attorney's fees of $7,500.00. (R. 294-297). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 13, 1973 WAS 
NEVER SIGNED OR ACCEPTED BY A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED QUORUM 
OF HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND THE CONTRACT CREATED IS 
VOIDABLE. 
The Articles of Incorporation of Heath Development 
Company provide that "three members of the Board of Directors 
shall constitute a quorum and shall be authorized to transact 
business and exercise the corporate powers of the corporation". 
Article X, Articles of Incorporation. Section 16-10-34, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 provides that, "The act of a majority of 
the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present 
shall be the act of the Board of Directors". Applying this 
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statute in the Heath Development Company situation would 
mean that if there is a quorum of three directors present, 
that the vote of two of the directors could bind the cor-
poration. 
Of the five directors in Heath Development Company, 
four attended the meeting at which the Earnest Money Agreement 
was presented. Two of the directors were purchasers on the 
Earnest Money Agreement and thus were personally interested 
in having the corporation agree to the offer or purchase, 
leaving only two disinterested directors. The question of 
considering interested directors for purposes of quorum re-
quirements is discussed in 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation, 
Sec. 426 at P. 280 as follows: 
"Although, there is at least some authority 
which recognizes an interested director's 
eligibility for quorum purposes, the majority 
and better view is that a director who is 
disqualified by reason of personal interest 
in the matter before a directorsf meeting 
loses, pro hac vice, his character as a 
director, and he cannot be counted for the 
purpose of making out a quorum." 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the majority view that 
interested directors cannot be counted for quorum purposes 
in the case of Rocket Mining Corporation vs. Rulan J. Gill, 
25 Utah 2d 434, 483 P. 2d 897 (1971). In this case the court 
determined that there was a "properly constituted board of 
four directors" and that only one of the directors had a 
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personal interest in the matter before the board. The court 
held that: 
"In reference to the question as to whether 
there was a proper quorum to transact business, 
Sec. 16-10-38, UCA 1953 provides that such a 
quorum shall consist of a majority of the 
number of directors fixed by the Bylaws or 
. . . stated in the Articles of Incorporation 
. . . we accept the proposition advocated by 
the plaintiffs that in matters where a director 
has an interest adverse to the corporation he 
cannot participate to bind the corporation." 
The court concluded that because one of the directors received 
a direct benefit he was disqualified from participating in the 
action of the board and could not be counted for quorum purposes. 
This rule was followed again by the Utah Supreme Court as 
expressed in the dicta of Branch vs. Western Factors Inc., 28 
Utah 2d 361, 502 P. 2d 570. In Branch, the court referred to 
an 1898 Utah case, Singer vs. Salt Lake Copper Manufacturing 
Company, 17 Utah 143, 53 P. 1024, in which a director voted in 
favor of a transaction between himself and the corporation. 
The court stated that "there were present at the meeting four 
of the five directors so there was a quorum excluding the in-
terested director". 
An example of application of the majority rule is the 
Colorado case of Colorado Management Corporation vs. American 
Founders Life Insurance Company, 359 P. 2d 665 (Colo. 1961). 
In the Colorado case only six of eight board members of plaintiff 
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were in attendance. Of the six present, three were directors 
of another corporation and considered to be interested in the 
matter before the board. The bylaws of the plaintiff cor-
poration provided that five directors would constitute a 
quorum. In determining that the three disinterested directors 
did not constitute a quorum, the court held at page 667 as 
follows: 
"A director cannot with propriety vote in the 
board of directors upon a matter affecting his 
own private interest anymore than a judge can 
sit in his own case; and any resolution passed 
at a meeting of the directors which a director 
having a personal interest in the matter voted 
would be voidable at the instance of the cor-
poration, without regard to its fairness, pro-
vided the vote of such director was necessary 
to the result. It follows t^ hat a director of 
a corporation cannot be counted in determining 
the existence of a quorum wl^ en the transaction 
under consideration is one i|n which the director 
has a personal interest adverse to that of the 
corporation." Citations omitted. 
It would follow that in the case before the court that a proper 
disinterested quorum of directors never considered the Earnest 
Money Agreement and the action taken was not binding on the 
corporation. Of the four directors present at the meeting 
where the offer was considered, two directors wanted to purchase 
the sole asset of the corporation. Their offer of purchase 
was $150,000.00 below what these same two directors agreed to 
list the property for, three months earlier. The conflict 
created by their personal interest is obvious. 
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The following cases are representative of the majority 
rule that interested directors are not to be considered for 
quorum purposes: Goldie vs. Cox, 130 F. 2d 695; Kerbs vs. 
California Eastern Airways, Inc. (Del), 90 A. 2d 652; Whicher 
vs. Delaware Mines Corp., 52 Idaho 304, 15 P. 2d 610, 616; 
Alward vs. Broadway Gold Mining Company, 94 Mont. 45, 20 P. 2d 
647; Adams vs. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 
P. 2d 147; Oregon, Rugger vs. Mt. Hood Elec. Co., 143 Ore. 193, 
20 P. 2d 412; Duncan vs. Ponton (Tex. City App.), 102 S.W. 2d 
517; Hein vs. Gravelle Farmers' Elevator Co., 164 Wash. 309, 
2 P. 2d 741. 
POINT II 
THE TRANSACTIONS OF INTERESTED DIRECTORS ARE VOIDABLE 
AT THE OPTION OF THE CORPORATION AND MAY BE SET ASIDE WITHOUT 
SHOWING ACTUAL INJURY. 
There is no question that all of the parties involved 
knew that they were dealing with a corporation and with cor-
porate property. (T. 348-349). The majority rule, followed 
by Utah as expressed in Branch vs. Western Factors, Inc., 28 
Utah 2d 361, 502 P. 2d 570 (1972) is that a contract: "made by 
the corporation with its officers are not void per se, but at 
most voidable merely at the election of the corporation or its 
representatives within a reasonable time." It is also stated 
in the Branch case that "a director occupies a fiduciary re-
lationship to his corporation and his personal dealings with 
the corporation may be avoided unless good faith and fairness 
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are shown". 
This implies that the burden of showing good faith is 
on the interested director. Without the showing of good 
faith the contract will be set aside. In the case of Sweeney 
vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P. 2d 126, a 
transaction of a corporation with some of its directors was 
examined. The court agreed with the proposition that "when 
a fiduciary deals for his own interest with the beneficiary, 
in case any question arises such dealings should be scrutinized 
with great care, and the burden is upon him to show good faith 
in the transaction". The cross-claimants failed to introduce 
any tangible evidence concerning the true value of the pro-
perty involved or to try and establish the fairness of the 
transaction. On cross examination concerning how the purchase 
price of $250,000.00 was arrived at, Mrs. Housely stated that 
"it was what we thought we had the possibility of getting a 
loan on and it was worth offering to see if they would accept" 
(T. 403-404). Thus the primary concern of the interested 
directors was on how much money they coiild borrow as individuals 
and not necessarily what the true value of the trailer park was. 
The case of Runswick vs. Floor, 116 Utah 91, 208 P. 2d 
948 (1949) follows the majority position that "so long as cor-
porate officers act fairly and in good iiaith, they are not 
precluded from dealing or contracting with the corporation 
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merely because they are its officers". However, when this 
situation exists the contract will be valid: 
"Provided they act in good faith and provided 
there is a quorum of directors on the other 
side of the contract, so that the vote of the 
interested director is not necessary to the 
adoption of the measure; and even in the 
latter case the contract is good in law." 
In the situation before the court there was not a disinterested 
quorum on the other side of the contract and thus there was no 
contract. Even if there had been a disinterested quorum on the 
other side, the contract is voidable on a showing of lack of 
fairness to the corporation. 
As mentioned previously, since 1898 it has been the law 
in Utah that if a director deals with his corporation in entire 
good faith, fairness and honesty and the corporation is rep-
resented by other disinterested directors, then the transaction 
is valid. However, "where the corporation is represented in 
the transaction by interested directors or officers who deal 
with themselves the contract is voidable at the option of the 
corporation merely because of the relationship without proof 
of actual fraud or of actual injury to the corporation". 19 Am. 
Jur. 2d Corporations Sec. 1291. The law on this subject is 
stated further in Section 1291 of Am. Jur. as follows: 
"Similarly, it is said that if a director places 
himself in a position in which he may be tempted 
by his own private interests to disregard those 
of the corporation, his transactions are voidable 
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at the option of the corporation and may be 
set aside without showing actual injury. It 
is clear that contracts between a corporation 
and its officers and directors are voidable for 
unfairness and fraud. In any event, the burden 
of proving the fairness of transactions be-
tween a corporation and its directors or officers 
is upon the directors and officers seeking to 
uphold its validity, and if they fail to do so, 
either the transaction may be set aside, or the 
corporation may affirm the transaction and hold 
the director or officer liable for profits re-
ceived by him or for losses sustained by the 
corporation." 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING EXHIBITS D 9 
AND D 10. 
Before the cross-claimants could prevail on their claim 
for specific performance the court was under an obligation to 
examine closely the fairness of the transactions. Defendants 
offered Exhibits D 9 and D 10 to show the lack of fairness in 
the transaction and the fair market value of the property in-
volved as determined in an arms-length transaction. 
Exhibit D 9 which was not admitted by the trial court 
is an Earnest Money Agreement dated and signed March 15, 1974 
by and between the two interested directors as sellers and 
Hugh Wayman, an outsider, as purchaser. The total purchase 
price of $400,000.00 or $150,000.00 more than what the inter-
ested directors offered to purchase the same property for two 
months earlier. Max Engman, the banker, testified that the 
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purchasers on the January 13, 191A Earnest Money Agreement 
did not qualify for financing. It was only after Hugh Wayman 
came into the picture that financing was obtainable. (T. 382-
383). The interested directors testified that even though 
they were directors of the corporation, they did not intend 
at this time to inform anyone else in the corporation of the 
resale at $150,000.00 profit and in fact, no one else was 
informed. 
On April 9, 1974 the president of the corporation informed 
the plaintiff realtor that the corporation would not consummate 
the Earnest Money Agreement of January 13, 1974. Plaintiff's 
response was to submit another Earnest Money Agreement dated 
April 11, 1974 from Hugh Wayman as purchaser directly to the 
corporation for purchase of the same property for $400,000.00. 
This document, Exhibit D 10, also not admitted by the trial 
court, was offered to establish the fair market value of the 
property involved as determined in an arms-length transaction. 
In Sweeney vs. Happy Valley, Inc., cited previously, the ques-
tion of determining the fair market value of land was involved. 
The court held as follows: 
"The rulings of the trial court reflect the 
correct view that in order for evidence 
concerning sales of other property to be 
admissible as bearing on the market value 
of the property in question, the test of 
comparability of the sales must be met: 
That the type of land, its location, its 
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uses, actual and potential/ and the time and 
circumstances of the sale are sufficiently 
similar, that the price paid for the other 
property can fairly and reasonably be re-
garded as having probative value as to the 
worth of the property in question." 
The documents offered and not accepted by the trial court meet 
the criteria of the Sweeney case. An examination of these two 
documents show the unfairness of the offer of January 13, 1974. 
There is no explanation for the increasfe in offering price by 
$150,000.00 except that the higher offers are arms-length 
transactions not controlled by interested directors. Both 
subsequent offers should have been examined by the court in 
determining whether or not the interested directors contract 
was fair to the corporation. 
POINT IV 
THE PROVISIONS OF §16-10-74, U.C.A., (1953) WERE NOT 
COMPLIED WITH AND THE SALE OF THE CORPORATE ASSETS SHOULD 
BE SET ASIDE. 
Section 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated sets forth the pro-
cedure to be followed when a corporation sells all of its assets 
other than in the regular course of business. The first step 
is for the board of directors to "adopt a resolution recommend-
ing such sale". This recommendation of sale is then submitted 
"to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which may be either 
an annual or a special meeting". The central feature of this 
statute is the right given to every shareholder to vote on 
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whether or not he wants to sell the corporate assets.. 
The Utah Supreme Court has considered the application 
of this statute in two prior cases. Neither case deals with 
the fact situation now before the court. The first case was 
Grover vs. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P. 2d 598 (1970). This 
was an action by a corporation to rescind a contract for the 
sale of land nearly a year after the deed had been delivered. 
Among other statements the Supreme Court stated that it was a 
"sham corporation" in which virtually all of the stock was 
owned by a husband and wife. It was also pointed out that 
the "sham corporation" had the assistance of counsel throughout 
the entire negotiation and sales process. A year after the 
deed had been delivered and a substantial payment received, a 
son who owned one share out of 100 shares issued, filed the 
action on behalf of the corporation for recission under the 
technicalities of §16-10-74. The Supreme Court correctly ruled 
that the corporation could not now hide behind the formality 
of not having the sale approved by the stockholders. 
The second case is similar to the first one. In U-Beva 
Mines vs. Toledo Mining Company, 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P. 2d 867 
(1970) U-Beva Mines attempted to void a lease with an option 
to purchase when the defendant was late with an $87.00 tax 
payment. U-Beva set up the claim that its stockholders had 
not approved the lease and option and on that basis it should 
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be cancelled. It was pointed out that the lease had been 
in effect for some four years with substantial investment 
having been made by the lessee. The court stated "it would 
hardly seem to lie in the corporations mouth to assert in-
validity of the lease under the statute after having received 
and kept monthly rentals for about four years". 
Neither of these cases fit the fact situation now before 
the court. The only money which has changed hands is a $500.00 
earnest money deposit which was refunded. No final documents 
have been signed and no deeds delivered. The purchasers did 
not go into possession nor make improvements on the property. 
The corporation is not a sham corporation. The time period 
involved is a few months, not years as in the two cases mentioned. 
Indeed, it would seem that this is the Very situation that 
§16-10-74 Utah Code Annotated was designed for. To hold other-
wise would deny protection of the law to the minority stock-
holders who were not directors and present when the offer of 
January 13, 1974 was considered. 
It is the general rule that this statute inures to the 
benefit of the shareholder and is not assertable by the cor-
poration. When the corporation is taking a course of action 
consistent with what the minority shareholder would take, 
it would be an unnecessary act for a shareholder to assert 
this statute himself, 58 ALR 2d 784 (1958). On the basis of 
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§16-10-74 Utah Code Annotated, the decision of the District 
Court should be reversed and dismissed. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTEREST OF 6% PER 
ANNUM ON PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES FROM APRIL 10, 1974 UNTIL 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff's agent contacted the 
president of defendant corporation on April 9, 1974 to inform 
her of the closing set for the next day. It was on this occa-
sion that defendant's president informed plaintiff that the 
corporation would not consummate the transaction. Plaintiff 
was awarded attorney's fees of $5,000.00 based on the listing 
contract of November 13, 1973. 
Defendants maintain that it was error to award any 
attorney's fees in that there was no sale. Defendants claim 
that the error is compounded by awarding interest on the 
attorney's fee from the date of the alleged breach of contract. 
Plaintiff's counsel testified as to the amount of time in-
volved but nothing was submitted as to when their services 
commenced or why interest on the full amount of the attorney's 
fees had been earned on the day of the alleged breach of 
contract. The award of attorney's fees to plaintiff's coun-
sel should be disallowed and particularly the award of inter-
est on the attorney's fees should be disallowed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as 
cited herein, appellants respectfully request the court to 
reverse the judgment of the trial couri. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, 
WEST & SCHAERRER 
C. Reed Brown 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellants 
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